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'Why is it that a plant which has survived two world wars, the great depression, 
afew recessions and ever-toughening environmental legislation cannot remain 
and be part of Australia s manufacturing base? ,/ 
'At the end of the day the attitudes and influence of the Illawarra unions were 
such that the shareholders could not be confident ... '2 
This paper considers the closure of the Port Kembla copper smelter 
and refinery, Southern Copper Limited, in 1995, after over eighty 
five years of unbroken operation and a change of ownership to CRA 
in 1981. It argues that the closure is most accurately understood as a 
resolution reflecting the exigencies of CRA's business situation at 
the time. The decision was taken as Southern Copper faced 
increasingly heavy pressures including a strengthening Australian 
dollar, demanding environmental standards and community 
expectations. These pressures were faced at a time when both the 
industrial relations climate and the manufacturing sector were 
undergoing significant change. The paper suggests that the strength 
and actions of the IJIawarra unions played little part, if any, in the 
decision to close the smelter, despite local mythology and CRA 
statement to the contrary. 
Historiography 
In the last twenty years business history has not been weU explored, 
orweU developed, in Australian historiography. Such study expanded 
in the 1950s and 1960s, but by the end of the 1980s, as David Merrett 
has noted, 'the terrain had been reclaimed by journalists' writing in 
a more popular rather than academic style.3 For historiographical 
consideration the field itself may be usefully divided into two sub-
areas. There is business history that assays the larger role and situation 
of business in Australian capitalism, and there is that which treats 
particular companies or businesses. While economic historians have 
provided macro-style studies of business activity in Australian 
capitalism there has been less focus on individual businesses. The 
conservative historian Geoffrey Blainey remains the most notable 
company historian in Australian. 
As yet Australian labour history has had little notable intersection 
with business history, particularly the side of business history centred 
on the individual company or business unit. The treatment of 
organisations by labour history deals more often, and more 
extensively with trade union, Labor Party and institutional history. 
However, some significant, recent work by labour historians in the 
1990s suggests worthwhile change to this pattern. Eklund's work on 
industrial welfare and Bridget Griffen-Foley's work on Australian 
Consolidated Press and the formation of the Packer Empire are recent 
signs of a welcome bridge in the apparent hiatus between business 
and labour history.' Their accounts follow those of Patmore and 
Taksa, who utilised management study so as to more fuUy understand 
employer and management approaches.s 
Historians of industrial relations in Australia have also examined 
business conduct in their accounts of industrial practice and dispute. 
Wright's History of Australian Employers is a particularly valuable 
contribution in this genre. 6 A knowledgeable and useful study, 
the book's focus on employers' history also makes it 
importance for an informed and enhanced understanding of 
the contemporary workplace.7 
It is possible to explain the dearth of business history study under 
the wider field of labour history. Trade union, political party, 
government and institutional records are more easily available and 
open to independent research rather than those of business. As weU, 
the sympathies and interests oflabour historians more often lie with 
unions and working class. The study of businesses and their situations, 
particularly commissioned history, may trouble those with working 
class sympathies and sensitivities. Indeed, is the study of business 
itself coUusion with the interests of capital? Is the writing of 
commissioned business history tainted, or less pure, than the penning, 
for example, of commissioned union histories? The thought of 
censorship by business may be anathema for labour historians; a far 
greater anxiety than the possibility of curtailment by other 
organisations. 
Nevertheless, despite the concerns canvassed above there are 
valid and defensible reasons for labour history to include business 
history in its armoury. The availability of union, political and state 
records, and attention to their histories allows these groups open to a 
degree of scrutiny and accountability. Consequently public, and other 
interests are served by the availability of this history. Organisational 
activities, functioning and goals, 'warts and aU' can be explained, 
placed and understood. 
Yet a further reason for labour historians to assay business history 
would be to bring insights and different political perspectives to those 
offered by the conservative, economic and journalistic writers. Wright 
has argued that the neglect of serious study of employers confines 
and limits the understanding of industrial relations practice and 
discourse. Similarly, labour history's understandings of workers and 
their worlds, may benefit from further quality consideration of 
business and company history. 
The Story 
The paper now offers a sample of business history, focusing on 
Southern Copper Limited. It shows a major intersection between 
labour, life and community in the working class area of Port Kembla 
and a multi-national company (CRA) whose board sat in Melbourne 
and accounted firstly to the interests of shareholders. 
On 5 January 1995 the Port Kembla copper smelter and refinery 
of Southern Copper Limited closed. This paper provides one answer 
as to 'why' the plant closed. Southern Copper Limited was a new 
name assigned to the works in 1990. It was intended to signal what 
CRA management viewed as 'a chance to forge a new identity and 
establish ourselves as a highly competitive operation'. 8 It was to be 
a symbol of major change. The business was originally established 
as the Electrolytic Refining and Smelter Company of Australia 
Limited, and commonly known as ER&S. The longstanding 
nickname of 'eat, rest and sleep' utilised the ER & S initials.9 
The planning and building of the original Port Kembla copper 
smelter and refinery occurred throughout 1907-08, with production 
commencing in early 1909. The formal February opening of the 
Works by G.C. Wade, Premier of New South Wales, was a sign of 
the importance placed by the state government on the expansion of 
industry. Indeed, the former colonial state's encouragement of 
industry in the area had been evident in the Port Kembla Harbour 
Act of 1898. This Act instigated work to upgrade the Harbour, with 
the aim of attracting new industry to the revamped, deeper, safer, 
all-weather port. The harbour and the availability of coal attracted 
ER&S, which was the new joint venture business between the miner 
MtMorgan Company and the German firm Aaron Hirsch und Sohn. lo 
An attempted relocation ofthe Dapto-basedAustralian Smelting 
Corporation to Port Kembla had stalled in the spring of 1907 and 
did not proceed; some of the unemployment and disappointment of 
this failure was alleviated by the advent of ER&S. II The works 
provided welcome employment to Port Kembla and continued to do 
so throughout most of the century. Employing close to 300 workers 
upon opening, workforce numbers at ER&S fluctuated, closely 
affected by business and wider economic circumstances. In 1918, 
for example, there were 600 employees at the works, many of whom 
had moved to live in Port Kembla. 12 The more modem preferred 
separation of industrial and residential areas was not of great matter 
in this era. The company provided housing, albeit of differing styles, 
for some workers and staff including the Manager. Indeed it was not 
until well after World War Two that Manager Arthur Fanin Evans 
broke with tradition, in choosing to live in Wollongong rather than 
occupy the Manager's Private Lane residence. 
The life of the works was not without its difficulties, and there 
were occasions when continuance was precarious. Yet business 
continued despite recessions, depressions and disasters. However 
by 1980 when new owners CRA arrived at Port Kembla it could 
well have seemed that the smelter had been there forever and was 
going to be there forever. CRA acquired the works when it took over 
some interests of Broken Hill South Ltd and North Broken Hill 
Limited, the two shareholders ofER&S. At the same time CRA also 
assumed control of a large holding in mining and metals, including 
Cobar Mines Pty Ltd who were a major supplier of concentrate for 
the Port Kembla smelter. 
What did the mining giant acquire in Military Road Port Kembla? 
They got a run down, rather outmoded smelter and refinery that had 
suffered from years of impoverishment. Although since World War 
Two ER&S had invested in some new plant and technology, (the 
'new' stack of the mid-50s being the most visible example) by the 
1980s the need for considerable capital outlay was sorely evident as 
Bob Jones, who was General Manager for some years in the 1980s 
recalled: 
It was all old technology which was then only in China and North-
west Africa or somewhere, everyone else had moved on two 
generations of technology, flash and all other things and here was 
SC in technology that was so outdated that it wasn't funny." 
Broken Hill South's main capital investment in the 1970s had 
overwhelmingly centred on phosphate mines in north-western 
Queensland, while their other operations, including the smelter, had 
suffered the consequences of this capital drain.14 There had been 
little money available at the plant for upgrading as the smelter rarely 
returned big profits; indeed even in post war boom times, annual 
figures were more likely to be modest rather than abundant. 
CRA's arrival coincided with the decade in which Australia's 
business environment, including industrial relations practice, would 
change significantly. The 1980s was the era when terms such 
escalating competition in the world economy, including that from 
emerging newly industrialising Asian economies. As the globalisation 
process and rhetoric gained sway with policy makers, Australian 
industry was being urged to reform. National concerns such 
employment and debt levels were being linked to success, and 
restructuring of business and industry. ER&S, their employees and 
their unions were not alone in having to face these changes and 
challenges. And in the highly-organised labour stronghold of the 
Illawarra, the arrival of CRA with its reputation as a hard-line 
industrial player, immediately raised concern and suspicion. 15 
As well, the new owners faced the worry of operating an 
outmoded and polluting smelter and refinery complex adjacent to a 
residential district. The fields that surrounded the original buildings 
had long since gone. Port Kembla now had schools, shops, clubs 
and houses all within olfactory distance, if not actual sight, of the 
works. In both the local community and in the echelons of the State 
Pollution Control Commission, there was continuing disquiet about 
the effects of the plant's discharges. Sulphur dioxide emissions, 
(sulphur dioxide being a by-product of the copper processing), as 
well as lead levels, acid rain and waste dumping all caused local 
resident groups concern. 
Yet there were other circumstances that perhaps made the smelter 
passably attractive to CRA. The parent company had significant 
interest in Bouganville copper, and it appeared that a useful synergy 
could be created between the rich Bouganville mine and Port Kembla 
processor. CRA also had Cobar based copper interests. There were 
some signs of promise early in the new relationship. In 1981 for 
example, the year following CRA's arrival, ER&S obtained 
significant amounts of raw feed from both Cobar and Bouganville. 16 
Initially the change in ownership had little material effect on life 
at the works. Indeed CRA's entry was marked by some caution. In 
late 1979 they had flagged their intention of undertaking a feasibility 
study on updating and expanding the Plant, and in late 1980 a special 
study team was formed for this task. CRA had either to upgrade or 
close down; that much was clear. 17 Changing environmental standards 
meant that the previously 'acceptable' pollution levels would no 
longer be so. The growing authority and importance of the State 
Pollution Control Commission meant that the degree of pollution 
inherent in the process and technology would not be sanctioned for 
much longer. The timeframe set by the environmental authority 
eventually forced CRA to make their decision on the future of the 
plant. So it was in 1988 that major redevelopment of the works 
commenced. 
The 1988 decision to retain and upgrade the Port Kembla smelter, 
surprising to some, may have been influenced by CRA's experience 
of the 1987 sale of its Woodlawn mine near Goulburn. This formerly 
loss-making enterprise had returned a profit in its first year of new 
ownership and the CRA Executive may have been anxious to avoid 
similar ignominy.ls Certainly the financial outlay and related risk 
involved in the upgrade was greatly eased by the concurrent entry of 
Japanese partners taking 40% equity. 
CRA's choice to redevelop was viewed most positively, even 
ecstatically, by employees. 19 The decision to spend over 150 million 
dollars in the upgrading was translated by most workers as a job 
until retirement and concomitant financial security. The future felt 
assured; surely no one would commit that much money without 
intention to stay?20 Management, meanwhile, hoped that this outlay 
would buy a more efficient and productive operation, as well as 
alleviate pollution problems. 
as 'competition', 'efficiency', 'productivity' and micro-
economic reform became common usage. The nation faced 
The plant redevelopment was accompanied by a shift in the 
industrial relations conduct and atmosphere at the plant. Jack 
Garaty, a new CRA appointed General Manager moved in 
with a brief to deal with 'outmoded, restrictive practices' .21 EJ 
-
The late 1980s and early 1990s played host to a period of challenging 
industrial and cultural change at Southern Copper. Despite significant 
progress in working conditions achieved through union and 
management efforts the pressures on all concerned increased. The 
introduction of annualised salaries, new rosters and other different 
ways of working were insufficient to match the pace and extent of 
industrial change required by management. CRA wanted all their 
operations to provide sufficient returns to shareholders and despite 
the plant upgrade, production levels were still too low and pollution 
levels too high. Ongoing cost reductions became paramount as the 
need for future expenditure on another round of plant redevelopment 
and pollution minimisation became obvious. 
In 1994 reductions in labour costs were one area of management 
focus. Numbers employed at the works had declined significantly 
under CRA ownership, reducing from over 550 direct employees in 
the early 1980s to 392 by 1990, with management wanting a further 
reduction in the short term to 375. 22 In October 1994, the site was 
paralysed by a harsh, lengthy dispute over a new enterprise agreement 
and related workforce reductions, including forced redundancies. 
Employees and their representatives felt betrayed when Management 
pulled the Agreement before registration by the Industrial Relations 
Commission to require further reductions in employment levels. 23 
Management expressed the view that the conflict was actually about 
'SCL's ability to manage its operations in a way which will allow it 
to survive and compete in a tough international environment. '24 
Changing economic circumstances, including disappointing 
production levels, higher than anticipated operating costs and a 
strengthening Australian dollar, had led management to believe that 
they would not be able to keep their side of the bargain. That was, 
unless the employment levels set out in the new draft agreement 
were modified. 2s It was also felt that the Southern Copper Board 
would not agree to further expenditure in the area of hundred and 
twenty million dollars required by the Environmental Protection 
Authority unless manning cuts occurred. 26 
On Friday October 28 1994 Southern Copper Managing Director 
Paul Wand announced that there was a 'high probability' that the 
plant would close in early January 1995.27 The closure announcement 
effectively ended the strike. Employees returned to what had become 
their short-term jobs. Closure was confirmed in late November and 
a few days later emp loyees received eight weeks redundancy notice.28 
Early in 1995 all production had stopped and the works moved into 
a care and maintenance phase under a skeleton crew. 
In January 1995 Mark Rayner, CRA Director and Group 
Executive wrote from Collins Street in Melbourne to Alison Crook 
at the New South Wales Office of Economic Development about the 
closure of Southern Copper. Rayner unequivocally lays the blame 
for the closure on the IlIawarra unions, stating that: 
Despite the progress which the senior management team had made 
over the past 18 months in changing the workplace relationships 
and culture, at the end of the day the attitudes and influence ofthe 
Illawarra unions were such that the shareholders could not be 
confident that even after another major capital injection sustainable 
international competitiveness would be achievable. Regrettably, it 
was this lack of confidence in the attitudes of the workforce and 
their union leadership which underlaid the decision to move to 
closure.29 
Rayner ties Illawarra unions to the question of international 
competitiveness. These unions make a useful whipping boy for a 
Board who had made some interesting decisions with their 
shareholders' capital. Allocating blame to IlIawarra unions was a 
less painful process than whipping the CRA board itself. Yet 
circumstances had changed considerably since their arrival in the 
Illawarra. By 1994 insurgency had closed the hugely promising 
potential of the Bouganville copper mine, nor were their copper 
interests elsewhere in Australia partiCUlarly promising. Woodlawn, 
a former raw feed supplier to the works had been sold some years 
previously. The redevelopment of the late 1980s, centred around the 
Noranda reactor, had not been a panacea. Although production had 
improved and pollution had been considered, neither had reached 
'satisfactory' levels. The amount of capital provided for 
redevelopment limited the effectiveness of its results, so did the time 
frame allowed for the works to come up to required standard. 
Conclusion 
By the spring of 1994 the hovering sword of the Environmental 
Protection Authority edged closer and, despite some initial promise, 
CRA's search for another capital-generous equity partner had failed. 
Environmental concerns had shadowed the works at least since World 
War Two. By 1994 time was running out for Southern Copper, 
suffering failure to thrive despite the significant changes under the 
CRA regime. It was not the Illawarra unions who closed Bouganville 
or chose the form, and limited the expenditure, of the redevelopment. 
It was not the Illawarra unions who strengthened the Australian dollar 
and stopped the often profitable process of copper scrap. Nor was it 
the Illawarra unions who protested vehemently about living near a 
noxious industry and it was not the Illawarra unions who failed to 
find another equity partner. Attitudinal differences between CRA 
and Illawarra labour were but one salient factor amongst the 
confluence of several in the closure of Southern Copper. By 1994 
the once promising symbiosis between CRA and the Port Kembla 
works had vanished, leaving a beleaguered Southern Copper no place 
in CRA's future. Paul Wand, the Managing Director of Southern 
Copper at the time of closure explained that the plant didn't 
'compete'30. To understand why that was the case required an 
understanding of CRA. Understanding CRA 'business' helps our 
understanding of labour, loss, grief and unemployment in Port 
Kembla. 
Epilogue 
In July 1999 Port Kembla Copper signed an Enterprise Agreement 
with the Australian Workers Union. The works should move into 
full production by October this year, some four years since the 
announcement that Southern Copper was destined for closure. The 
wholly Japanese owned PKC have invested hugely in upgrading 
production capacity and attempting to minimise plant emissions. 
Although some local residents have protested vociferously about 
the reopening others have looked for work at the smelter. More than 
3,000 people applied for employment, and well over half were from 
the Illawarra region, including Port Kembla. 
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